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Judges and Juries:
Separate Moments in the Same Phenomenon
Gerald Torres* and Donald P. Brewster**
Trial by juries is the Englishman's birthright, and it is that
happy way of trial, which notwithstanding all revolutions of
the times, hath been continued beyond all memory to this
present day; the beginning whereof no history specifies, it be-
ing contemporary with the foundations of this state, and one of
the pillars of it, both as to age and consequence.1
To undermine a social order you must undermine its faith-
not merely in the justice of its heroes .... but in the injustice
of its victims which, although a little bit more difficult, is by
no means an impossible feat. It has been happening, and is
happening before our very eyes, and may coincide with a pro-
cess we call "history."'2
i. allegro3
The history of law and of fundamental legal ideas is the his-
tory of the struggle over political and economic power. The evolu-
tion of law and legal institutions has been complex. The social and
intellectual struggles the law reflects are manifested on the level
of symbol as well as in the material conditions of everyday life.
Neither aspect of this evolution should be slighted, nor considered
as separate phenomena. Though separable, perhaps, for analysis,
they are better understood as different moments in the same
phenomenon.4
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B., 1974, Stanford University;
J.D., 1977, Yale University; L.L.M., 1980, University of Michigan.
** A.B., 1979, Stanford University; J.D., 1986, University of Minnesota. Special
thanks to Frances Nash for her comments and editorial suggestions in turning this
manuscript into something resembling English. To think we were all educated at
the same university. We would also like to thank those colleagues and teachers
cited in the text for their comments and suggestions.
1. Richard Burn, The Justice of the Peace (1754), quoted in E.P. Thompson,
Trial By Jury, 50 New Society 501, 502 (1979).
2. Ren6 Girard, Disorder and Order in Mythology, in Disorder and Order 80,
87-88 (Paisley Livingston ed. 1984).
3. "It is of no importance that what we do ends up being melodic." C. Wolff to
Stockhausen, quoted in Jean-Franqois Lyotard, Energumen Capitalism, 2
Semiotexte 11, 12 (1977).
4. See, e.g., Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John Rule, E.P. Thompson & Cal
Law and Inequality
The jury, which we now treat as a sacred institution and as
one measure of political legitimacy, did not emerge full-blown as
an automatic response to the pressures of democracy. Instead, the
institution of the jury emerged only slowly. Those taking the jury
to be an unqualified good, an antidote to the rigidities of strict le-
galism and state power,5 see in the extant jury and its intellectual
apparatus an almost fully legitimized institution with its own strict
rules and structure. 6 They do not see its unruly emergence and
the deeply equivocal role that it has played historically. Most lay
observers also ignore the deep and powerful distinction between
the political role played by the criminal jury and that played by
the civil jury. These two institutions are at most fraternal twins
which have been differently treated by harsh parents.7
This introduction is neither a contribution to the historical
scholarship, nor a comment on the historical reasons for the differ-
ent development of the civil and criminal juries. Instead, it ana-
lyzes the legitimating role juries play in democratic and legal
symbology. The Penn/Mead trial and Bushell's Case are at the
root of the elevation of the jury to its vaunted place in democratic
mythology. Invoking similar mythological consequences are the
cases of jury nullification, for at few points in the law is the out-
come ever so certain or the law reread with such finality as in the
jury verdict.8 In few places is the "reason" of the law so closely
synonymous with the values of the culture.9 The jury in the act
of judging expresses the "reason" of the culture. That cultural ac-
Winslow, Albion's Fatal Tree (1975) [hereinafter cited as Albion's Fatal Tree]; John
Langbein, Albion's Fatal Flaws, 98 Past & Present 96 (1983); Peter Linebaugh,
(Marxist) Social History and (Conservative) Legal History: A Reply to Professor
Langbein, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 212 (1985).
5. "We do not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration
upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 466 (1897).
6. This should not ignore the pressures that remain on juries. The spate of ar-
ticles and opinions on "specially qualified juries," the proposals for special courts
for "technical" issues, and the complaint against the "death-qualified jury" indicate
that the jury as an institution is far from being completely accepted. Its role is lim-
ited, and there is something to be read in the limits imposed. See, e.g., William
Luneburg & Mark Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury
Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litiga-
tion, 67 Va. L. Rev. 887 (1981); Welsh White, Death-Qualified Juries: The "Prosecu-
tion-Proneness" Argument Reexamined, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 353 (1980).
7. John Phillips & Thomas Thompson, Jurors v. Judges in Later Stuart Eng-
land: The Penn/Mead Trial and "Bushell's Case," 4 Law & Inequality 189 (1986)
(discussion of difference between criminal and civil juries).
8. See E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (1975);
Albion's Fatal Tree, supra note 4 (especially discussion of the use of the jury nulli-
fication in criminal prosecutions and comparison with jury nullification in the civil
context).
9. See John Rule, Wrecking and Coastal Plunder, in Albion's Fatal Tree,
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tion expresses both the mythology and morality of a time that may
not be reflected in the positive law, but it exposes the positive law
as an often distorting mirror of the culture and society that the
positive law regulates. 10 Thus, the role, function, and evolution of
the institution of the jury is a useful place to examine the relation-
ship between law and culture, between the myth of democratic le-
gality and the operation of law.
Juries arose in a nondemocratic political culture, yet the
early juries were relied upon to give popular validation to the
court's view of the lord's law. The early fights, therefore, were be-
tween the courts and the juries over who had the proper authority
to pronounce the law."1 Control over who could say "what the law
is" was central to the legitimating function of the law as a whole. 12
The jury box is where the people come into the court: the
judge watches them and the jury watches back. A jury is the
place where the bargain is struck. The jury attends in judg-
ment, not only upon the accused, but also upon the justice and
humanity of the Law.13
The early jury was under the control of the courts to an extent
that today would be an impermissible outrage, but it was in the
context of a system which gave much wider latitude to the juries
to decide questions of law and fact even if they suffered from its
expression.' 4 The rude procedures adopted by the judges to con-
trol the juries merely highlight the political nature of the verdict
of a quasi-democratic jury' 5 in a nondemocratic setting. It is also
confirmed by the continuing process of screening a jury and by
jury vetting, that is, packing or limiting nominations to the jury.16
supra note 4, at 167; Douglas Hay, Poaching and the Game Laws on Cannock
Chase, in id. at 189.
10. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pre-
tentious, are what I mean by the law." Holmes, supra note 5, at 461.
11. Stephen Roberts, Jury Vetting in the 17th Century, Hist. Today 25 (Feb.
1982).
12. "By definition, there is no politics when there is agreement. In politics,
choices are made that bind those that dissent. Thus, both those that exercise polit-
ical power and those that are subject to it may be forced to consider questions of
legitimacy." Jan Deutsch, Harvard's View of the Supreme Court: A Response, 57
Tex. L. Rev. 1445, 1446 (1979).
13. E.P. Thompson, The State Versus Its 'Enemies,' 46 New Soc'y 127, 130
(1978).
14. Phillips & Thompson, supra note 7, at 221-24.
15. "Quasi-democratic" was chosen because we do not want to overemphasize or
pretend that the jury was an institution open to all. Instead, the early jury was lim-
ited by property qualifications intended to secure the "best of the county" to act in
their "advisory" role to validate the actions of the courts. It was only when juries
ceased bringing in the proper verdicts that the tension between the positive law and
the political culture was highlighted. This was especially true in the more overtly
"political" cases.
16. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 13.
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In a sense, jury verdicts are anomalous.17 They are events
which leave a cultural trail, yet it is a trace with little residue.
The outcome in a jury trial, like a sign,18 has a triadic structure. 19
It represents an event to a judge and to the community, signifying
and constituting the event; it represents an expression of "the
law." Jury verdicts are signifiers with greater significance for non-
specialists, for the community of which the lawyers and judges are
merely a part. Yet their trace, for those who can read it, reveals
for the specialist the path of the law.20 Lawyers and judges are far
more comfortable on paths that are clearly blazed; troubling ver-
dicts lead to appeals, where possible, and to "modernizing" legisla-
tion, where they are not. The appellate opinion is more significant
for the specialist than the jury verdict it is interpreting because it
constitutes a thing, a reified form of legal cultural detritus, the
"stuff" of principle: it is the law.
Opinions, when they are published, are mobile signifiers. The
17. Jury decisions are anomalous to the extent that the normal process for
resolving a dispute is for the disputants to put the matter before a court for the
judge to decide. Take as evidence the necessity to constitutionalize the jury and the
ordinary structure of judicial decision-making systems.
18. A sign is anything that stands for something else. "All thought ... must
necessarily be in signs." 5 Charles S. Peirce, Collected Papers 5.251 (Charles
Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds. 1960).
19. Every relation involving mind, cognition, or intelligence is genuinely triadic.
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genu-
ine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of
determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same tri-
adic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.
2 Id. 2.274.
First is the conception of being or existing independent of any-
thing else. Second is the conception of being relative to, the concep-
tion of reaction with, something else. Third is the conception of
mediation, whereby a first and second are brought into relation. To il-
lustrate these ideas, I will show how they enter into those we have
been considering. The origin of things, considered not as leading to
anything, but in itself, contains the idea of First, the end of things that
of Second, the process mediating between them that of Third ...
Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is Third.
6 Id. 6.32.
Firstness seems to be related to the Real, and Secondness to the
Imaginary, for where Thirdness is the domain of mediated triangular
relations, Secondness is ontologically the domain of the apparition of
what is other, and psychologically is the domain of reaction, struggle,
and duality.. ..
... We recall that, as Foucault has pointed out [in The Order of
Things 57-58 (1970)] .... the tripartite semiotic theory of the Stoics, for
whom the 'sign' included the "signifier, the signified and the 'conjunc-
ture' ... , was reduced to a binary relation between signifier and sig-
nified in the seventeenth century.
Anthony Wilden, System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange
267-68 (1972).
20. See Holmes, supra note 5.
[Vol. 4:171
SEPARATE MOMENTS
existence of such signifiers or reproductions is what constitutes the
event as an original, which makes the opinion authentic and ex-
poses trial transcripts, depositions, briefs, and unarticulated or
"unreasoned" jury verdicts as mere imitations. An original and au-
thentic expression of the law delineates the boundaries of justice,
establishing it as something which exists in fact. Positing a source
of principle implies that the law and the justice it represents can
be replicated, thus defining justice as a thing in itself of which the
opinions are merely the concrete expression. However, as Jacques
Derrida has noted:
[M]aintenance of the rigorous distinction ... between the [sig-
nifier] and the [signified] . . . leaves open the possibility of
thinking of a concept signified in and of itseUf, a concept sim-
ply present for thought, independent of a relationship to lan-
guage, that is of a relationship to a system of signifiers....
[T]hough, from the moment that one questions the possibility
of such a transcendental signified, and that one recognizes that
every signified is also in the position of a signifier, the distinc-
tion between signified and signifier becomes problematic at its
root.21
These "unreasoned" jury verdicts are the anomalous representa-
tion of justice, the background against which the published opin-
ions exist and which signifies them as original and legitimate. The
system of legal decision making, by cloaking itself in the whole
cloth of published opinions, represents to the community the law's
ability to replicate and disseminate itself as legitimate and authen-
tic wherever it is to be found, and preserves the belief in the rea-
soned justice of the law.
One characteristic of modernity, especially prevalent in law,
is the belief that legitimacy has been lost.22 We preserve opinions
as the signs of the past to maintain (or to capture) our link to legit-
imacy. To analogize and paraphrase from a passage in Dean
MacCannell's The Tourist,23 the Supreme Court makes the notion
of justice seem legitimate. The court of appeals makes the
Supreme Court seem legitimate. The trial court makes the appel-
late system seem legitimate. The jury makes the trial court seem
21. Jacques Derrida, Positions 19-20 (Alan Bass trans. 1981).
22. See generally Karl Liwith, Meaning in History (1949). But see Hans
Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Robert Wallace trans. 1983). For
discussion and analysis of the Lwith/Blumenberg debate, see Robert Wallace, Pro-
gress, Secularization and Modernity: The Lowith/Blumenberg Debate, New Ger-
man Critique 63 (Winter 1981). On questions of legitimacy in a specifically legal
context, see Deutsch, supra note 12; The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique
(D. Kairys ed. 1982). See also Jan Deutsch, Corporate Law as the Ideology of Capi-
talism, 93 Yale L.J. 395 (1983) (book review of Kairys, id.).
23. Dean MacCannell, The Tourist (1976).
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legitimate.24 And, of course, it is finality which gives legitimacy to
the expressions of both the jury and the Supreme Court. Both are
rooted in and derive their legitimacy from our political and cul-
tural past which they justify and rewrite.
The identification of the material and symbolic content of the
jury process reveals it as a compelling semiotic event. The more
the jury system is discussed, dissected, analyzed, and memorialized
in law review articles, the more the original event, which these
opinions mark, is held out, signified, and highlighted as legitimate
and authentic, producing in the community a desire (and not only
a legal obligation) to participate in and maintain the signified of
which these opinions are signifiers. Yet, even those sophisticated
critics who rail at the ignorance and "bad" decisions that are said
to suffuse the jury system25 fail to understand how jury verdicts
function as signifiers which reaffirm the judicial system itself as
original and legitimate.
The jury then functions on the level of both icon and symbol.
There is an important distinction between those two functions.
The icon is the receptacle of the past, "[i]t exists only as an image
in the mind."26 It is thought of as the thing which preserves our
liberty by wresting "the law" from the experts, from the scientists
who manipulate it.27 The symbol, in the Peircean taxonomy, has
its being in the future.28 "A symbol is essentially a purpose, that is
to say, a representation that seeks to make itself definite or seeks
to produce an interpretant more definite than itself."29 These cat-
egories are not necessarily stable, however.
Michael Thompson suggests one way of understanding how
things move between the categories suggested by Charles Peirce as
well as how the value of institutions is intimately connected to the
social and political roles they play. In Rubbish Theory: The Crea-
tion and Destruction of Value ,3o Thompson posits two broad cate-
gories into which every society places the cultural objects it
24. Id. at 155.
25. See Thompson, supra notes 1, 13; Hay, supra note 9; Langbein, supra note
4; Peter Linebaugh, The Tyburn Riot Against the Surgeons, in Albion's Fatal Tree,
supra note 4, at 65; Linebaugh, supra note 4.
26. 4 Peirce, supra note 18, at 4.447.
27. Richard Harvey Brown, From Legalism to Delegitimation: Nineteenth-Cen-
tury Solutions and Twentieth-Century Crises in Law and Social Change-A Com-
mentary, 17 New Literary Hist. 249 (1986). "[The law which, though a science
requiring years of specialized training, is also an art requiring an almost sacred her-
meneutic." Id. at 252-53.
28. See infra notes 39-40 for a discussion of precedent.
29. 4 Charles S. Peirce, New Elements of Mathematics 261 (C. Eisele ed. 1976).




manufactures, consumes, and maintains: the transient and the du-
rable. Objects placed in the transient class are consumed rather
than preserved. The transient is observed as having a finite life-
span, decreasing in value over its useful life. The development of a
sociopolitical aesthetic determines the category into which any
given cultural artifact is placed rather than the categorization be-
ing dependent upon any superficial or inherent physical character-
istics. In this process, durable objects are more desirable and
valuable than transient objects. The sociopolitical is introduced by
the struggle of opposed and competing societal elements to keep
its objects of interest in the durable class and force competing ob-
jects into and maintain them in the transient. Thompson's inquiry
is into the possibility, and the dynamics, of change within such a
process:
[T]he two overt categories which I have isolated, the durable
and the transient, do not exhaust the universe of objects.
There are some objects (those of zero and unchanging value)
which do not fall into either of these two categories and these
constitute a third covert category: rubbish.
My hypothesis is that this covert rubbish category is not
subject to the control mechanism (which is concerned primar-
ily with the overt part of the system, the valuable and socially
significant objects) and so is able to provide the path for the
seemingly impossible transfer of an object from transience to
durability.31
Transient objects decrease in value until they become rubbish
without value. These objects exist in the realm of the consumed
and the used up, existing only as shadows at the outer margins,
awaiting their chance at discovery and the subsequent apotheosis
as a durable object. Rubbish, at this point, is in the realm of First-
ness-the possibility that some quality may be abstracted or iso-
lated in the future. What is observed is not an orderly and logical
progression of value but the capricious cycles of fashion and
power. We observe not the transient, but rubbish, as that which
eventually endures as the durable.
Rubbish thus becomes the point of intersection in the strug-
gle between opposed and competing elements in society. Rubbish
can either be discarded to make room for progress (purportedly,
and in the guise of, the new and the improved-tomorrow's major-
31. Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted). "True Burkean conservatism knows what is to
be conserved only after it has been conserved." James Boyle, The Politics of Rea-
son: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 685, 737
n.153 (1985) (emphasis in original). Perhaps the first account of the relationship be-
tween kitsch (trash or artistic rubbish) and politics can be found in Clement
Greenberg, Avant-Garde and Kitsch (1939), reprinted in Art and Culture: Critical
Essays 3 (1961). See generally Gillo Dorfles, Kitsch: The World of Bad Taste (1969).
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ity) or else retained, reused, or rebuilt as durable (in the guise of
tradition-yesterday's majority). These struggles over rubbish,
which are readily observable in our daily lives,3 2 are thus coded
struggles33 to determine which objects will become transient and
which will become durable in a society. In these struggles, the ten-
sions provoked by the fundamental disparities of power, the lack
of consensus inherent in the competing processes of value forma-
tion, and the central position the category of rubbish comes to oc-
cupy are apparent, for we observe a struggle that is impossible to
mediate: there is no compromise. 34 There is a dialectical opposi-
tion between the two fundamentally incompatible processes of
value formation, and the political struggles (in the broad sense of
the term "the political") will force a decision for one side or the
other, upholding the process and the authority and legitimacy of
the victors.
There is an illusion here that the law could be known and ap-
plied and a community formed in terms of it. This is impossible,
32. See, e.g., zoning struggles and the controversies surrounding the preserva-
tion of historic buildings. Thompson, supra note 30, at 35. See especially the dis-
cussion of the dispute over the Isaac Rice mansion in New York City in John
Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the Dilemmas, 80
Mich. L. Rev. 355, 386-91 (1982) ("[Alccounts of the proceedings leave little doubt
that Board No. 7's concern for the Mansion's preservation was secondary to its ap-
prehension about how a thirty-story tower might change the West Side's land use
and socioeconomic character."). For a discussion of the literature on the semiotic
properties of the built and natural environments and their theoretical applications
to law, see Costonis, supra, at 392 n.116. See also Jonathan Culler, Junk and Rub-
bish: A Semiotic Approach, Diacritics 2 (Fall 1985). This issue can also be seen in
the context of cultural legitimation. See supra text accompanying note 22.
33. Jean-Frangois Lyotard would refer to these struggles as competing narra-
tives. Jean-Franqois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge
15-17 (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans. 1984); see also Michael Foucault,
Power/Knowledge (1980); Nancy Jean Holland, A Theory of Meaning After the
End of Philosophy (1982) (both discuss problems associated with ways of knowing
and the impact of structuralism on theories of meaning); Gillian Rose, Dialectic of
Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law (1984) (focuses specifically on the jurispru-
dential impact of structuralism and modern linguistic theory).
34.
To be accepted, a principle-whether a judicial precedent, a legislative
enactment, or an administrative rule-must be sufficiently general and
coherent to represent something the polity believes can be identified
despite the changes the future will bring. Any workable consensus,
moreover, must also meet the political requirement of being at least
minimally acceptable to the various groups and individuals involved.
When this consensus is unanimous, tradition and progress coalesce,
thus vitiating the problem of legitimacy. When agreement is some-
thing less than unamimous, however, there will be arguments, and
they may be formulated in terms of legitimacy.
Deutsch, supra note 12, at 1447.
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"an infatuation and absolute injustice, in point of fact."35 When
the law is known, legitimacy is no longer presented as a fact, and
the consequences of knowing the law and that a community or
group is justified in imposing it are always serious: "The ability of
the mind to set up, by means of acts of judgment, formally coher-
ent structures is never denied, but the ontological or epistemologi-
cal authority of the resulting systems, like that of texts, escapes
determination."36 Thus, this authority is always under stress be-
cause valuation and order are unstable.37 They are expressions of
cultural evolution which, through the mask of stability, create the
illusion of permanence and security. This foundation of felt secur-
ity is the basis for innovation and change and, in fact, is a principal
element of change. As Yi-Fu Tuan has noted:
It is a mistake to think that human beings always seek
stability and order. Anyone who is open to experience must
recognize that order is transient.... [Life] is change or it is not
life at all. Because change occurs and is inevitable, we become
anxious. Anxiety drives us to seek security, or, on the con-
trary, adventure-that is, we turn curious. The study of fear is
therefore not limited to the study of withdrawal and retrench-
ment; at least implicitly, it also seeks to understand growth,
daring, and adventure.38
With our culture in thrall to the system of transience, rub-
bish has come to be important since it is at a crucial intersection in
the process through which the transient can become durable. The
jury system as one source of this legal "rubbish" becomes an essen-
tial form of canon expression for the legal system. Many examples
suggest that rubbish holds the key for opening up the possibilities
35. Jean-Franqois Lyotard & Jean-Loup Th6baud, Just Gaming 99 (Wlad
Godzich trans. 1985).
36. Paul de Man, The Timid God, 29 Georgia Rev. 533, 550 (1975).
37. "[H-luman works are vulnerable .... They are subject to change and decay
... in a mental sense. Even if their existence continues they are in constant danger
of losing their meaning. Their reality is symbolic, not physical; and such reality
never ceases to require interpretation and reinterpretation." Ernst Cassirer, An Es-
say on Man 184-85 (1944).
38. Yi-Fu Tuan, Landscapes of Fear 10 (1979). Thus, despair itself may be seen
as a sign of progress, a form of critical optimism, not in spite of but because of the
sorrow it feels and expresses:
Everything goes past like a river and the changing taste and the vari-
ous shapes of men make the whole game uncertain and delusive.
Where do I find fixed points in nature, which can not be moved by
man, and where I can indicate the markers by the shore to which he
ought to adhere?
8 Immanuel Kant, Sammtliche Werke 625 (Gustav Hartenstein ed. 1868), quoted in
Paul Arthur Schilpp, Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics 73 (2d ed. 1960). But cf. Paul D.
Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. Legal Educ. 222 (1984) (discussing the ethi-




for change in the legal system.39 In the context of a legal order
where taboo is anachronistic and where convention and custom
have made it difficult to facilitate change by merely breaking
rules, the possibilities for change may lie in the transformative po-
tential of the system's rubbish. This dynamic content is revealed
through the processes by which the functional elements in the
transient, that remain as the transient, become rubbish and can be
discovered and made durable. 40 The jury rewrites cultural codes
within a framework that both legitimizes the jury's authority and,
through specialized convention, limits its scope. The jury "instruc-
tion," the rules of evidence, and the interpretation of law versus
the finding of fact all limit the scope of the jury's legitimate func-
tion. Yet, it is beyond the narrow conventional function where the
jury itself validates and exposes the limitations of the positive
law. 4 1 It is a resort to the "other" law, to the humane law.42 The
durable "truth" emerges as a political validation.
ii. intermezzo
[Law is really a report on power. It is not the only way in which
social power is expressed in our culture, yet it seems the most le-
gitimate both because it is the most articulate and because it ap-
pears to be the most open to criticism aimed at change. As the
previous discussion has indicated, the law and its institutions can-
not be understood in isolation. The rhetoric justifying legal insti-
tutions, for example, often participates in the language of power
which pervades other social relations. Feminism, in many ways,
39. See Thompson, supra note 8; see also Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and
the Criminal Law in Albion's Fatal Tree, supra note 4, at 17. We do not address,
although it seems appropriate, the process by which decisions become precedent.
Since, theoretically, every decision has precedential value, why is it that only some
come to stand for the principles of the law and the rest are discarded as "rubbish"
while others reside in limbo waiting to be "discovered"?
40. For sophisticated discussions of precedent, see, e.g., Jan Deutsch, Precedent
and Adjudication, 83 Yale L.J. 1553 (1974); Jan Deutsch, Perlman v. Feldmann: A
Case Study in Contemporary Corporate Legal History, 8 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 1 (1974);
Jan Deutsch, Panzirer v. Wolf. A Study in Doctrinal Exegesis, 10 Sec. Reg. L.J. 160
(1982); Jan Deutsch, Zapata Corporation v. Maldonado: Assessing a Precedent, 5
Corp. L. Rev. 40 (1982); Jan Deutsch, Law as Metaphor: A Structural Analysis of
Legal Process, 66 Geo. L.J. 1339 (1978).
41. Revolution, in this context, can be defined as the point at which a
given political system has failed. Revolution, which signifies the loss
of legitimacy, occurs whenever enough individuals are sufficiently dis-
satisfied that the desire for replacement of choices embodied in the
present system outweighs concern over the potentially unsatisfactory
consequences of new choices.
Deutsch, supra note 12, at 1448.
42. "The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is
the history of the moral development of the race." Holmes, supra note 5, at 459.
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has provided the most thorough investigation of visible and invisi-
ble social control. That paradigm is explored in the following dia-
logue. The dialogue does not make a direct analogy to the
experiential content of women's lives, but instead it explores the
epistemological dynamic involved in the ideological feminization of
institutions. It is important to remember that the voices to which
power responds must be those that it can hear.]
DB: Isn't the jury really something unrestrained, spontane-
ous, and communal? Doesn't it threaten to break into the care-
fully structured system and transform it?
GT: The jury is an ever present threat to the reality estab-
lished by the rest of the system. To demonstrate that let me sug-
gest some of the qualities which are conventionally used to
characterize juries:
1. They are capricious and unpredictable.
2. They are easily swayed by emotion and are thus not given
to hard logical thinking. They operate by "feel" or intuition.
3. They are incapable of distinguishing which facts are truly
important. They do, however, seem to have access to mysterious
sources of folk wisdom and possess a mysterious ability to judge
character and assess blame.
4. This access to the well of the folk, however, must be "con-
trolled," "instructed," and often even "directed."
DB: Oh come on, those are the same tired and invalid stereo-
types commonly used to characterize women. One of the
problems, you see, is that the invalidity of those stereotypes has
only begun to affect their legitimacy.
GT: Exactly, which is why we should read the common liter-
ature or conventional wisdom as a feminist. We must become "a
resisting rather than an assenting reader and, by this refusal to as-
sent, to begin the process of exorcizing the male mind that has
been implanted in us."43 For instance, let's examine why juries
play the feminine stereotype to the patriarchal law represented by
the judge .. .44
43. Judith Fetterley, The Resisting Reader: A Feminist Approach to Fiction
xxii (1978).
44. Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on A
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 Berk. Women's L.J. 39, 49 (1985) ("[C]an we
glimpse enclaves of another set of values within some existing legal structures? Is
the judge 'male,' the jury 'female'?"). Menkel-Meadow notes that "in this enter-
prise of labeling by gender [there is] a danger of creating further polarization
rather than integration. Some polarization may be necessary before we can inte-
grate, and indeed we are already situated in a world with more polarization than
efforts to integrate." Id. at n.62.
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DB: Wait a minute! I expected a better response from you,
and I resist this analogy because the content of women's oppres-
sion is characterized by violence and coercion in ways that make
your analogy facile. There is always a danger in using gendered
stereotypes. Why take the risk? Female, male, masculine, and
feminine are equally socially constructed, although they are not
constructed socially equal.
GT: I recognize that danger, but I want you to understand
that defining things in masculine or feminine terms is not to prac-
tice a form of biological reductionism or essentialism, although
some people who use those terms do.
DB: That is exactly my point, many people do. Gender char-
acterizations must be understood as socially constructed categories
that have important material as well as symbolic consequences.
For example, those categories make things like marital rape le-
gally incoherent. You can't separate the material impact of those
stereotypes from their symbolic use. I resist the relativity of the
comparison. The coercion of women seems to me deeper, more
permanent, and more profound.
GT: We don't disagree. Those characterizations exist as part
of the epistemological structure of our culture, and they operate to
explain as well as to oppress.45 I recognize the material and sym-
bolic nature of the judge and jury and of the masculine and femi-
nine. Bushell's Case, for example, reflects the concrete imposition
45. See Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr. & Herbert Marcuse, A Cri-
tique of Pure Tolerance (1965):
This is, prior to all expression and communication, a matter of seman-
tics: the blocking of effective dissent .... The meaning of words is
rigidly stabilized. Rational persuasion, persuasion to the opposite is all
but precluded. The avenues of entrance are closed to the meaning of
words and ideas other than the established one-established by the
publicity of the powers that be, and verified in their practices ...
Thus the process of reflection ends where it started: in the given con-
ditions and relations. Self-validating, the argument of the discussion
repels the contradiction because the antithesis is redefined in terms of
the thesis....
Impartiality to the utmost, equal treatment of competing and con-
flicting issues is indeed a basic requirement for decision-making in the
democratic process-it is an equally basic requirement for defining the
limits of tolerance. But in a democracy with totalitarian organization,
objectivity may fulfill a very different function, namely, to foster a
mental attitude which tends to obliterate the difference between true
and false, information and indoctrination, right and wrong. In fact,
the decision between opposed opinions has been made before the pres-
entation and discussion get under way-made, not by a conspiracy or a
sponsor or a publisher, not by any dictatorship, but rather by the "nor-
mal course of events," which is the course of administered events, and
by the mentality shaped in this course.
Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in id. at 95-97. One might also look as well to
George Orwell, 1984 (1948).
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of the judge's will on an unruly juror. Bushell was jailed after all.
It would be a mistake, therefore, to underestimate the oppressive-
ness of the tactics used to coerce the jury into adopting not only
the analytical approach, but, more important, the result the court
wished to impose. That said, I must acknowledge that however
different the content of jurors' and women's oppression may be, I
can better understand the pervasiveness of women's marginaliza-
tion by considering the ways in which the politically powerful fem-
inize those they wish to dominate. Epistemologically, the threat
posed by the jury to the order composed by the law is necessary.
To define the masculine, one must have its other, the feminine:46
for part of the legal system to be "principled," something else must
be "unprincipled," otherwise the distinction would disappear.47 If
the feminine element were not projected outward onto the jury,
where it can be controlled, it might emerge from the judges them-
selves:48 it would compromise the role the law has created for the
judge.
DB: Let me get this straight. When you say you reject bio-
logical reductionism or essentialism, are you suggesting that the
male and the female are more than their biological attributes? Or,
are you suggesting, as Professor MacKinnon put it, and I think it
applies equally well for "the female": "Male is a social and political
concept, not a biological attribute. As I use it, it has nothing
whatever to do with inherency, preexistence, nature, inevitability,
or body as such. It is more epistemological than ontological.... ,,49
In other words, are you saying that the projection of traditionally
stereotypic feminine characteristics onto the jury is descriptive of
46. See, e.g., David Cole, Getting There: Reflections on Trashing From Feminist
Jurisprudence and Critical Theory, 8 Harv. Women's L.J. 59, 79-80 (1985) ("Our
culture denies the feminine an independent voice and defines the feminine as other
to man's one, as object to man's subject."); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Femi-
nism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 Signs
635 (1983) (defines feminist analysis and applies it to traditional areas of the law in
order to reveal the male point of view as the epistemological perspective of the law
generally).
47. Ellen C. DuBois, Mary C. Dunlap, Carol J. Gilligan, Catharine A. MacKin-
non & Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values. and the
Law-A Conversation, 34 Buff. L. Rev. 11 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Feminist Dis-
course]. MacKinnon stated:
[I]t makes a lot of sense that women might have a somewhat distinc-
tive perspective on social life. We may or may not speak in a different
voice-I think that the voice that we have been said to speak in is in
fact large part the "feminine" voice, the voice of the victim speaking
without consciousness.
Id. at 27.
48. See MacKinnon, supra note 46.
49. Id. at 636 n.3.
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the epistemology of male legal ideology as characteristic of differ-
ent parts of the legal system?
GT: Oh, you bet. That is why the occasionally "willful"
judge, that is, the judge who is acting like a jury, in imposing an
idiosyncratic brand of justice on "the law," is thought to be an
abomination of the system. The Realists, for example, were pillo-
ried for suggesting that, occasionally, something other than "rea-
son" or "principle" lay behind a particular decision.50
DB: Let's see then. The ideological structure of the projec-
tion of these characteristics onto juries is essentially self-
protective?
GT: Right. As usual, only by creating an "other" can the self
be shielded from disturbing impulses. Yet, the judge envies the
jury's spontaneous power to do justice and must guard against the
dangerous impulse to be jury-like. The judge must impose instruc-
tions on the jury to make it more judge-like. The judge must tell
the jury what it can know. The jury's understanding must be
made to conform to what the law says it can understand.
DB: Then it is perhaps no coincidence that the jury is also
the source of extra-legal community within the legal system. It is
the jury which represents the judgment of the community, which
speaks for the people and not for the legal hierarchy except to the
extent that it is controlled or that it has internalized the hierar-
chy. Juries are not to be trusted because they react emotionally
rather than logically; without judicial instruction, they cannot
grasp the reality of the case before them. Just as women resist
their subordination through feminism, so jurors resist their subor-
dination through nullification. In neither instance does the resist-
ance appear as anything but exceptional. Sexism can claim that
feminism proves we live in a gender-neutral society, just as jury
nullification is claimed to prove the jury's autonomy. The system
needs the assent of the community to function. It needs the public
expression of consent for legitimacy, and yet it fears to give the
community real power.
GT: Right. Historically, the jury in this system, if I may
stretch a conceit, had to be courted, but that just means controlled
through a form of ritual in which the courted assents, but over
which the courted has no real control other than outright refusal
to participate, and yet even that refusal is problematic.51 Remem-
50. Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 74-91 (1977).
51. See, e.g., Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice 94-98 (Oxford World's Classics
Ed. 1980).
"Almost as soon as I entered the house I singled you out as the corn-
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ber that both consent and assent are problematic and only make
sense, in this context, from the perspective of one who has no au-
thority to originate the ritual.52 Assent, then, has to appear to be
freely given to be legitimate, yet it can't be freely made.53 The
irony is that control must wear the mask of freedom.
iii. rondo
The symbol of democratic legitimacy, relief from a world "of
laws and not of men"54 is one of the central functions of the jury
panion of my future life. But before I am run away with by my feel-
ings on this subject, perhaps it will be advisable for me to state my
reasons for marrying-and moreover for coming into Hertfordshire
with the design of selecting a wife, as I certainly did."
The idea of Mr. Collins, with all his solemn composure, being run
away with by his feelings, made Elizabeth so near laughing that she
could not use the short pause he allowed in any attempt to stop him
farther, and he continued:
It was absolutely necessary to interrupt him now.
"You are too hasty, Sir," she cried. "You forget that I have made
no answer. Let me do it without farther loss of time. Accept my
thanks for the compliment you are paying me. I am very sensible to
the honor of your proposals, but it is impossible for me to do otherwise
than decline them."
"I am not now to learn," replied Mr. Collins, with a formal wave
of the hand, "that it is usual with young ladies to reject the addresses
of the man whom they secretly mean to accept, when he first applies
for their favour; and that sometimes the refusal is repeated a second
or even a third time. I am therefore by no means discouraged by what
you have just said, and shall hope to lead you to the altar ere long.
Id. See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women
(1979) (especially the Introduction and Chapter 3).
52. See Fetterley, supra note 43, at xxii.
53. This section was suggested by my colleague Dan Farber who should not be
held responsible for its final form, but should be held at least partially responsible
for the content. For further discussion of these distinctions between masculine and
feminine ways of thinking, compare Feminist Discourse, supra note 47, at 27, 73-76
(exchange between Gilligan and MacKinnon over the explanatory power of the
"feminine voice" hypothesis) with Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine
Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1986); Suzanna
Sherry, The Gender of Judges, 4 Law & Inequality 159 (1986) (feminine perspective
independent of the existence of gender discrimination).
If the jury has been feminized, other conventions demand investigation. For
example, since antiquity hanging has been considered a "feminine," or female, form
of suicide and criminal execution (an "infamous" death) and a symbol of shame.
Could the term "hung jury" be a code of the court to remind the jury of the shame
of feminine symbolic death and to come back with a "correct" verdict? See Eva
Cantarella, Dangling Virgins: Myth, Ritual and the Place of Women in Ancient
Greece, 6 Poetics Today 91 (1985), reprinted in The Female Body in Western Cul-
ture: Contemporary Perspectives 57 (Susan Rubin Suleiman ed. 1986); see also
Jean-Franqois Lyotard, One of the Things at Stake in Women's Struggles, 20 Sub-
Stance 9, 10 (1978) ("Sexual theory and practice of men includes the threat of
death: or: sexuality makes no sense without a signifier.").
54. Novanglus, Boston Gazette, March 6, 1775 (pseudonym of John Adams), re-
printed in Novanglus and Massachusettensis; or Political Essays 84 (Boston 1819);
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because it reinforces our belief in the law by reminding us of its
source.5 5 The jury verdict is also the representation of the law as
practice rather than as object.56 The verdict pronounced by the
jury enters the law as the single product of a dynamic process that
is replicated in content only to the extent that it represents a mo-
ment in the transformation of legal culture.57 It is not like the
judge's ruling, which enters the legal culture as a local rule or as
an object in the form of a written opinion. That process is part of
the myth-creating structure of democratic legal ideology. The
practice of jury decision making is part of the structure of the
myth without which it would have no authority:58 "Myth is not an
independent or separate element in man's social and cultural life;
it is only the correlate and counterpart of rite. It has an explana-
tory function, but its principal task is not to explain physical phe-
nomena but human actions." 59 The jury and the myth it contains
explain and locate our situation and give comfort as they create
the felt sense of solidarity. Jury service is a kind of participation
that exists as a disjunction from everyday life and is one that
throws the quotidian into stark relief even as the matter to be con-
structed is made from life's most ordinary of elements.
The order of law is contained in the sense of justice that it
yields.60 Law does not yield complete justice; it can't.61 The truth
see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 393 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) ("gov-
ernment of men, not the government of laws.").
55. "The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond
with the actual feelings and demands of the community .... ." Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 36 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1963) (chapter on
criminal law).
56. "Verdicts are not 'administered': they are found." Thompson, supra note
13, at 130 (emphasis in original).
57. "[The jury's] function is to suggest a rule of conduct." Holmes, supra note
55, at 120.
58. "Revolution can thus be defined (in terms of the individual) as the replace-
ment of habitual by spontaneous political behavior. Spontaneous political behavior
in this sense is perceived by the individual as a free act, although it is, of course,
capable of being rationalized." Deutsch, supra note 12, at 1448.
59. Symbol, Myth, and Culture: Essays and lectures of Ernst Cassirer, 1935-
1945, at 248 (Donald Phillip Verene ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Symbol].
60. A "sense of justice contains the order of the law" because it is the cultural
framework within which the law and its workings may be perceived as "just." It is
part of the
"spontaneous philosophy" which is proper to everybody. This philoso-
phy is contained in: 1. language itself, which is a totality of determined
notions and concepts and not just of words grammatically devoid of
content; 2. "common sense" [conventional wisdom] and "good sense"
[empirical knowledge]; 3. popular religion and, therefore, also in the
entire system of beliefs, superstitions, opinions, ways of seeing things
and of acting, which are collectively bundled together under the name
of "folklore."
T.J. Jackson Lears, The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities,
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of the jury verdict is an experience felt on the part of those who
sit in judgment and in the finality of the trace that it leaves. It is
clear in this context that justice is not an analytic term, but ex-
presses that part of law that does not yield to analysis. Justice is
neither a term of explanation nor of classification, but of experi-
ence. That experience is validated by the quality of the process
which constructs social truth out of received values and insight.6 2
The extraordinary facts, which result in a trial, only bring the or-
dinary into focus or else reveal the very ordinariness of the facts
which form the basis of the case at bar. Facts, that which the jury
is totally empowered to find, merely reflect the construction that
the law tries to put on them as well as "the previous agreements
within a community about the consequences of a certain event." 63
Justice may be very well served either through jury nullification
or through a kangaroo court,64 but the mythmaking job of the jury
can only be done within the context of the law.
Thus, John Phillips and Thomas Thompson are right when
they say about the Penn/Mead trial:
These "not guilty" verdicts could not be rejected or altered by
the bench, and the resulting euphoria among the working or-
ders helped perpetuate the very potent counter-revolutionary
myth that English law was the guarantor of Englishmen's
rights. Why would Englishmen need a revolution to set them
free? The mob could be convinced that the law, of which it
understood very little, made all Englishmen free and equal. In
reality, of course, it did no such thing, but what chance has
truth against myth? Myths, like that generated by the Penn/
Mead trial itself, have frequently proven politically omnipo-
tent. Could the law survive otherwise? 65
The jury performed the mythmaking function by creating a way of
ascertaining the truth which is socially determined and not, there-
90 Am. Hist. Rev. 567, 570 (1985) (discussing the problems raised by the work of
Antonio Gramsci, especially his Prison Notebooks 1929-1935).
61. Legal discourse often confuses the issue of whether a belief is justified with
the issue of whether it is true.
If we have a Deweyan conception of knowledge, as what we are justi-
fied in believing, then we will not imagine that there are enduring
constraints on what can count as knowledge, since we will see "justifi-
cation" as a social phenomenon rather than a transaction between "the
knowing subject" and "reality."
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 9 (1979).
62. See John Dewey, Art as Experience 130 (1934).
63. Richard Rorty, Texts and Lumps, 17 New Literary Hist. 1, 3 (1985).
64. While there is much confusion over the derivation of the term "kangaroo
court," the principal attribute of this "court" is the way it apes the procedures of
the real thing, validating its actions, however lawless, by reference to and use of the
symbolism of the legal system.
65. Phillips & Thompson, supra note 7, at 229-30.
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fore, subject to the whim or caprice or bias of a single individual. 66
The deference the law gives to the jury as a guardian of our liber-
ties and as a protector against the state's excesses reflects its maj-
esty. A jury accepts power from the state in order to control the
power of the state. The jury's decision affirms the state's authority
even as it may flout the law the state's code represents. The sys-
tem of knowing, which defines the jury/lawmaking/law-reading
function, is a powerful tool for reaffirming the character of a cul-
ture and the values of a people that is more profound than the mo-
mentary consensus it yields.67
66. "[To make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious." 5
Peirce, supra note 18, at 5.265. "Man feels a deep mistrust in himself and in his
individual abilities. But on the other hand he has an extravagant trust in the power
of collective wishes and actions." Symbol, supra note 59, at 250.
67. "In retrospect, therefore, successful revolutions are perceived as spontane-
ous acts rather than rationalizations of manipulations that have succeeded in
achieving undisclosed political ends." Deutsch, supra note 12, at 1448.
